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The Pathology of Mass Surveillance: The UK, Bulk Interception and the European Court of Human Rights

It’s fitting that the same society that produced George Orwell with his warnings of a totalitarian dystopia stacked with all-prying monitors, surveillance and paranoia should yield up some of the most invasive surveillance regimes imaginable.  While some states have found the revelations from Edward Snowden the sort that should initiate, at the very least, modest changes, the United Kingdom preferred the opposite approach. It had, after all, been an indispensable ally to the US National Security Agency, its equivalent GCHQ always intent on going one better.

In 2016, the Snooper’s Charter, a name so innocuous as to imply impressive cuddliness, found its way onto Britain’s law books after two failed efforts.  That instrument’s more officious, and appropriate title, was the Investigatory Powers Act, deemed by Snowden “the most extreme surveillance in the history of western democracy.”  As Paul Bernal suggested in The Conversation on its passage, “It is not a modernisation of existing law, but something qualitatively different, something that intrudes upon every UK citizen’s life in a way that would even a decade ago have been inconceivable.”

Various efforts in Britain have been mounted against the all-consuming beast of mass surveillance.  The UK Court of Appeal did find in 2015 that the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act (DRIPA) failed to place adequate restrictions upon police officers in their attempts to access personal information, including web browsing history and phone records.  The discerning judges noted the absence of an independent overseer and appropriate safeguards that might have saved the legislation.

Last Thursday, the European Court of Human Rights took a rather different view from the national security boffins in the case of Big Brother Watch and Others v the United Kingdom. The legality of three different surveillance forms featured in the complaint by 16 applicants, launched in the immediate aftermath of Snowden’s disclosures: the bulk interception of communications; the sharing of intelligence with foreign governments; the obtaining of communications data from communications service providers.

While the applicants did not shun all forms of bulk interception, the relevant claim was that such a regime could hardly be seen to have “the quality of law because it was so complex as to be inaccessible to the public and to the Government” lacking “clear and binding legal guidelines” and “sufficient guarantees against abuse.”

The submission by the UK government was predictably heavy on the issues of threat, security and danger.  The greatest temptation of tyrants is the claim that what is being combated is new, fresh and entirely modern.  National security threats abound like a miasmic phenomenon, and not just that old nagging matter of terrorism. There was a degree of “sophistication” terrorists and criminals had adopted in communicating over the Internet so as to avoid detection. Encryption was being used; the volume of communications was so vast as to enable concealment.

By five votes to two, the Chamber found that the bulk interception regime violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights covering the respect for private and family life, home and correspondence.  The failing here was a conspicuous lack of oversight in selecting Internet bearers for targets of interception. There was also an inadequate system in filtering, searching and selecting any salient intercepted communications; and there was a pronounced lack of pertinent safeguards concerning “related communications data”.  Bulk interception did not, in of itself, violate the Convention; but clearly defined criteria was the essence of validity.

By six votes to one, the Chamber found that obtaining communications data from those in the communications industry also breached the protections of Article 8.  Article 10 of the Convention covering freedom of expression, holding opinions, and the imparting and receipt of information was also found to have been offended by both the bulk interception regime and obtaining communications from service providers.

The judges noted that the second and third applications involved “investigative journalists who have reported on issues such a CIA torture, counterterrorism, drone warfare, and the Iraq war logs [accepting] that they were potentially at risk of having their communications obtained by the United Kingdom authorities”.

The judges did, however, fail to bite on several fronts.   Sharing intelligence with foreign governments could not be considered a violation of either Article 8 or 10.  (This, in of itself, raises a set of problems given Britain’s security ties with various unsavoury states who might be all too happy to receive the UK’s bounty.)  On the issue of whether the surveillance regime breached Article 6 (covering the right to a fair trial), and the inadequacy of domestic processes in challenging surveillance measures suggesting a violation of Article 14 (prohibiting discrimination), the court remained unmoved.

The response of the UK government has been one of readjustment and sweetening. Whilst “careful consideration” would be given to the ruling, a new “double lock” oversight process, according to a spokesperson, had been introduced in the 2016 legislation. The process involved an agreement between an independent judicial commissioner and the authorising secretary of state in executing search warrants.  It is precisely such measures that must be regarded as the mandatory softeners in otherwise extreme security measures that never do what they claim to.

Despite the recent horror of her premiership, Prime Minister Theresa May, a figure instrumental in building the new British security state, can take comfort from Brexit in one fundamental respect: At the very least she might be able to prize Britannia away from the clutches of a European human rights court that continues to correct wayward member states obsessed with surveillance.


4 comments

  1. Rowen S

    This horror is coming to everyone, everywhere. I am glad I didn’t have children.

  2. jamesss

    What they are afraid of is us finding out what they have been up to. Around 15,000 or so of them. 7 billion of us.
    They must be ‘shit scared’

  3. Kyran

    “The greatest temptation of tyrants is the claim that what is being combated is new, fresh and entirely modern.”
    This fear used to justify the deprivation or removal of rights already in existence, so often promoted by those who claim to be the protectors of rights, is now so far advanced it seems the chances of stopping it are non-existent.
    The Saturday Paper has a really good, if not terrifying, account of what our alleged government is currently sneaking through, obviously with the consent and endorsement of the ‘MeToo’ Labor ‘alternative’. Tyrants all, we will soon get to choose which tyrant we prefer.

    “A new Office of National Intelligence will have increased powers to access personal information and scrutinise online activities. But who will monitor the monitor?
    Australia’s intelligence community is set to increase its monitoring of Australian citizens and bypass privacy laws blocking access to personal information, with its focus also expanding to domestic political activity for the first time since the 1970s.”

    Any discussion as to the competence of our ‘intelligence communities’ naturally assumes they have intelligence. A proposition that has no support, given the debacle currently playing out under the ‘Witness K’ farce.

    “ONI will also have access to personal information that other government agencies have collected for other purposes and may be able to access private social media accounts.
    Legislation to establish the new office confirms four more organisations will be designated as intelligence agencies – the departments of Home Affairs and Defence, the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), which tracks suspect financial transactions. They will be partially exempted from the Privacy Act to enable disclosure of personal information to ONI.”

    This may seem counterintuitive as the only prosecutions I am aware of in respect of money laundering and terrorist funding has been against corporations, not individuals. We are increasingly removing oversight from corporations but increasing it on individuals. Go figure. It gets worse.

    “The ONI legislation also broadens the definition of public information, allowing ONI to collect some online data that Australians might generally assume to be private. It describes this as “information relating to matters of political, strategic or economic significance to Australia that is accessible to any section of the public”. It appears the phrasing may allow it to include accounts on social media sites such as Facebook, even if they are set to private.”

    Curiously, the enquiry didn’t receive many submissions outside of government departments. Whether this is due to lack of interest or lack of knowledge such an enquiry was underway is a moot point.

    “In the only other submission to the inquiry, the Law Council of Australia said the privacy commissioner should be consulted. The council says the ONI legislation should include privacy protection measures, such as requiring privacy impact assessments and yearly compliance audits, appropriate training and public reporting on the number of instances in which information is disclosed or used inconsistent with the privacy rules.”

    The article quotes Senator Rex Patrick, who says;
    “If the intelligence community won’t trust elected members of parliament to examine their operations, at home and abroad, how can the parliament and public be fully confident that these very powerful agencies won’t one day be turned to partisan advantage by the government of the day in what could amount to a high-tech police state?”
    Former ONA analyst and now independent MP Andrew Wilkie is similarly concerned. “I have a natural suspicion of anything in Australia that extends the power of the security services – the power of the state – because I believe Australia has already reached what I call a pre-police state,” he says.

    https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/news/law-crime/2018/09/22/new-domestic-intelligence-powers/15375384006887

    There appears to be little difference in the extent to which these tyrannical governments will go to ‘save us’ from an all but non-existent tyranny. Whilst your article pertains to the British/EU example and Middleton’s refers to ours, there is one unsubtle difference. The difference being one that the English are currently negotiating the removal of.
    “By five votes to two, the Chamber found that the bulk interception regime violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights covering the respect for private and family life, home and correspondence.”
    One of the few advantages of England’s EU participation is the governance oversights with a strong protection regime against state run interventions. The British are seeking to leave that regime.
    Middleton’s article points out the bleeding obvious in the Australian context.
    “But who will monitor the monitor?”
    We have no such oversight in Australia as we have ceased observing UN conventions on rights for some time now. The government will now proceed to purchase goodness knows how many vans to remove any dissenters, and we have no protections.
    Thankyou Dr Kampmark. With all of the chaos associated with our dysfunctional government, this sort of thing is not nearly well enough appreciated by the ‘wider public’. Take care

  4. Patrick C

    If there’s no resistance to increasing mass surveillance then what a country ends up with is China’s social credit system, where your value as a human being is decided by electronic algorithm dreamed up, or is that nightmared up, by a group of people taking orders from low places.

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