Dangerous Allies makes a convincing case for greater Strategic Independence for Australia within the US Alliance, writes Denis Bright.

With the imprimatur of former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, this challenge to continued Strategic Dependence on the US Alliance comes with additional research from doctoral research scholar, Cain Roberts. Malcolm Fraser correctly claims that existing joint operational agreements between Australian and US military forces are really a cover for a continuation of Strategic Dependence.

Ongoing joint operations by naval ships from members of the US Alliance in close proximity to China and territorial waters claimed by China from Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines carry immense financial and political costs to Australia.

Dangerous Allies also questions the status of the Pine Gap Communication Base in Australia.

Malcolm Fraser claims that it now has an offensive role within the Alliance in supporting early warning installations in Taiwan, Japan and South Korea against the possibility of missile attacks from both China and North Korea.

Just one miscalculation in regional sabre rattling could drag Australia into retaliatory responses by the US.

In any wider military conflict in Asia, the Marine Air Ground Task Force in Darwin becomes involved as a mobile operational force on the ready.

Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Lisbon NATO Summit 2010

The advice from Malcolm Fraser as a seasoned Cold War Warrior should become part of the national public debate in Australia about our continued place in the Alliance.

Malcolm Fraser notes that the text of the ANZUS Treaty of 1951 insisted on the need for national sovereignty before any planned joint military response.

This is hardly possible in an electronic age when threats identified by early warning systems require instant attention.

In a global economy that has been re-energized by the rise of China, potential conflicts exist between compulsive loyalty to the US Alliance against financial losses from antagonizing China.

Using the successful model of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Malcolm Fraser wants the benefits of demilitarization across Asia and the Pacific to be considered.

Positive outcomes from sparks of independence in Australian foreign policy are easily identified.

Prime Minister Howard definitely took great strategic risks with his military involvement in East Timor in 1999 with reluctant support from President Clinton.

Previous prime ministers, including Malcolm Fraser himself, were not prepared to grapple with the challenges posed by Indonesian occupation of East Timor in 1975.

Other controversial issues from Malcolm Fraser’s three terms in office as prime minister could be used to illustrate the costs of maintaining Strategic Dependence beyond its use by date.

Such issues are very timidly covered in Dangerous Allies.

Follow-up interviews with Malcolm Fraser might also prompt responses from other senior national leaders who have been at the helm of Australian foreign policy.

Malcolm Fraser as the Custodian of Cold War Secrets

As a former stalwart of the US Alliance, Malcolm Fraser made arrangements for the monitoring of the accuracy of US MX missile tests after the election of President Reagan in 1980.

Cabinet documents show that RAAF surveillance aircrafts were prepared to cover touch-downs in the Tasman Sea.

The Labor Caucus of Prime Minister Hawke challenged these arrangements but avoided a showdown with the US on this issue. Had this issue not been resolved, Australia may have followed New Zealand’s Prime Minister David Lange to radically qualify this country’s commitment to ANZUS. Prime Minister Hawke was able to re-energise the Alliance through the formation of Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN).

The inaugural meeting of AUSMIN in 1985 brought defence and foreign affairs ministers from both countries together on a regular basis.

In the national debate about the implications of Dangerous Allies, Malcolm Fraser will inevitably be quizzed about developments within the Australia-US Alliance during his time as Prime Minister.

Malcolm Fraser’s recommendations are about the future of an Alliance which has evolved and deepened far beyond the textual arrangements of the original ANZUS Treaty. Australians are rarely made aware of the implications of these changes for Australian sovereignty.

Prime Minister Julia Gillard took Australia to global partnership with NATO at the Lisbon NATO Summit of 2010.

All Smiles for the US Alliance in 1985

Other historical examples of Alliance Creep need further attention. These issues and others await clarification from Malcolm Fraser and other senior national leaders who are still able to speak out:

• Did Malcolm Fraser restore visits by US naval ships carrying nuclear weapons and what is the current status of these visits?
• How did Malcolm Fraser resolve the role of the Pine Gap Communication Base?
• Were security issues involved in the decision by Sir John Kerr to dismiss Gough Whitlam?
• Were pressures placed by the US for continued recognition of the Pol Pot Regime after the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia from late 1978?

National archives in several countries now cover these controversial issues. There are also new revelations from Wikileaks and Edward Snowden to assist in deepening public debate about the US Alliance.

Malcolm Fraser defends the need for a more proactive Australian foreign policy commencing with diplomatic initiatives to accommodate a peaceful role for an emergent China.

Differences between firm allies have occurred in the past. Their resolution on terms favourable to Australia have been quite beneficial for national security.

Prime Minister John Curtin confronted Churchill to withdraw AIF Divisions from the Middle East in 1942. John Curtin followed with a successful appeal for US commitment to the defence of Australia and the South West Pacific.

MX Away My Friend: MX Away!

Gough Whitlam broke ranks with Strategic Dependency, at least temporarily, to oppose additional deployments to South Vietnam. Some senior ministers opposed the bombing of cities in North Vietnam.

It was Malcolm Fraser himself who insisted on a return to the traditional Cold War relationship with the US. Malcolm Fraser has finally stirred up the possum and this saga has a long way to run if public debate on the Australia-US Alliance continues.

Readers of Dangerous Allies and interested journalists can take up this challenge by asking the right questions of Malcolm Fraser and other national political mentors who have been at the foreign policy helms.

Graphics Available from Online Sources

Dangerous Allies Promotion from Melbourne University Press.